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  Abstract 
 
Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective 
decision making. Using cooperative game theory, Banzhaf (1965) developed an index to 
capture the numerical importance of voters in coalition building. This voting power index 
is still widely used today in applications to international politics. Yet, it assumes that voters 
are symmetric and focuses on particular voters only. This paper proposes a new measure of 
voting power which account for the numerical proximity between voters by capturing how 
often they appear in winning coalitions together. The index is also developed to account for 
the relative importance of coalitions and the relative linkages among coalition participants. 
We present an application to the governance structure of the International Monetary Fund, 
with linkages being represented by bilateral trade between voters. The results are able to 
explain several important features of the functioning of this particular voting body, and 
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International policy analysis makes frequent use of voting power indices to explain 
decision making in international fora, such as the International Monetary Fund, the 
World Bank and also the European Union. In such contexts, the classical voting 
power indices – developed first by Shapley and Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965) – 
remain used today and provide indeed helpful insights into the de facto distribution 
of power that can potentially deviate quite significantly from the notional 
distribution of voting shares. This is so because depending on the number of 
voting members, the majority threshold applied and the individual weights of the 
members, the latter’s actual ability to bring together coalitions required to reach the 
majority threshold can vary significantly from voter to voter. 
 
The classical power indices, however, assume that voters are symmetric, namely 
that ex ante voters are neutral with regard to the choice of partners for a coalition. 
Moreover, they focus on critical voters, i.e. the pivotal voters that can turn a losing 
coalition into a winning one. Yet, in practice, the assumption of symmetry among 
voters does not hold, in particular not in contexts where coalition building is 
involved. Indeed, the very notion of coalition refers to the principle of commonly 
shared interests between voters. Moreover, coalition building is a process that 
involves all coalition participants. Accordingly, a more realistic assumption is to 
attribute power not only to one, or a few critical voters, but to all  coalition 
members. 
 
To address these limitations, this paper proposes a new measure of voting power, 
namely: ‘numerical proximity’. While standard voting power indices provide no 
information on the proximity between voters, such proximity is an important 
determinant of coalition building. We introduce therefore this measure into a 
Banzhaf framework – to develop both a bilateral and normalized index – as well as 
the notion of linkages to capture the principle of commonly shared interests 
between voters. 
 
Moreover, we consider decision making at the International Monetary Fund, which 
is currently reviewing its governance, as a numerical example. We apply our index 
to the countries and constituencies represented at the Fund’s Executive Board, 
with linkages being proxied by bilateral trade between voters. Our numerical results 
are able to explain several important features of IMF Executive Board functioning, 
and illustrate perhaps more realistically the power of individual countries. Finally, 
we are also able to shed light on some possible changes in the structure of the 
Executive Board, for example those resulting from a merger of chairs held by some 
European countries. 6
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1. Introduction 
Collective decision making is an everyday phenomenon. In some situations formal voting 
procedures exist, in other situations decisions are made by consensus. Thresholds are most 
often simple majorities, but higher thresholds can exist for far-reaching decisions. Sometimes, 
the votes of individuals are weighted, in other contexts one person carries one vote. Despite 
many difference in setup, most of these situations have one element in common, namely that a 
single person, group, party or constituency alone does not hold a majority; hence, coalitions are 
necessary to reach the required majority and take decisions. 
Political economy theory, through cooperative game analysis, offers insights to understand 
coalition building. A first insight is that the notional size of a constituency (individual, country 
or group) can differ from its effective weight in the decision process. Theory therefore 
distinguishes between the former, also called voting share, and the latter, also called voting 
power. Voting power can be larger or smaller than the notional voting share, and the difference 
depends on how important a single constituency is in the overall context of coalition building.  
This insight into voting power is well-known in the context of domestic politics. Suppose for 
example that there are three parties, Red, Rose and Green, in a Parliament of 100 seats, with the 
first two having 49 seats, and the Green party having 2 seats. If a majority of 51% is needed, 
each party needs a coalition with one of the other parties to win the vote. All the parties are 
therefore equally critical
1 in terms of their capacity to build a majority coalition. Hence, the 
voting power of the three parties is equal, at 33.3%. For the larger parties, voting power is lower 
than their notional weights and the contrary holds true for the smallest party.  
A second insight from coalition theory is that voting power depends on the structure of the 
decision-making body. Again, in the example of a national Parliament, suppose the Rose and 
Green parties form a new party. This new party would have a majority of 51% and therefore a 
voting power of 100% as no other party would be needed for a majority. Hence, the new party’s 
voting power exceeds that of its constituting members, and the voting power of Red would be 
zero. 
The usefulness of formalised voting power indices, which map notional voting shares into 
voting power weights and take due account of the majority threshold as well as the number and 
size of other voters, has been widely recognized. The indices that are most widely used so far 
were developed by Banzhaf (1965), probably the most prominent index still today, and Shapley 
and Shubik (1954). Useful as they are, they include two assumptions that remain problematic: 
first, they treat voters as symmetric, meaning that every voter is assumed to be willing to enter 
                                                 
1  A critical/pivotal voter is a voter that, by adding its support, can turn a losing coalition into a winning one. 7
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into a coalition with any other voter, and that ex ante voters are neutral with regard to the choice 
of partners for a coalition. The second shortcoming is that they focus on a particular kind of 
voter, namely the so-called critical or pivotal voter. Roughly speaking, in the spirit of the 
Banzhaf index, voters are getting together and start building coalitions until they reach the 
majority threshold. The last voter is therefore considered as pivotal since it can turn a loosing 
coalition into a winning one and should be therefore rewarded for that. 
These assumptions are at odds since coalitions are more likely between voters, parties or 
countries that are in some sense closer to another. The very notion of coalition implies the 
principle of commonly shared interests. Gupta (2003) argues that these shared interests may 
vary over time and across members, but their purpose is to create a certain degree of linkages, 
that do not necessarily involve a formal commitment or a commonality of purposes among 
members of the coalition.  
This paper proposes to introduce a new measure of voting power: The numerical proximity, which 
captures how often individual voters appear in a winning coalition together according to the set-
up of the game: the allocation of votes, the number of players and the majority rule. The index 
produces a bilateral measure accounting for the frequency voters may be able to build winning 
coalition together within a Banzhaf framework that can be normalized to account for the times 
a voter allows potential allies to form a winning coalition with him. This set-up permits to 
introduce linkages on top of the numerical proximity: Voters are able to favour, in accordance 
to their bilateral linkages, a particular winning coalition, when a voter, with whom linkages are 
relatively strong, appears in the coalition. While in classical power indices voters are willing to 
share coalition because they may be winning ones, our set-up introduces the fact that voters 
may favour particular winning coalitions because they have relatively stronger linkages with 
others coalitions participants according to their numerical proximity. In other words, while the 
normalized Banzhaf index measures the times a voter is pivotal, the normalized proximity index 
measures which voters permit (more or less) to the latter to be critical. 
We present in this paper an application to the governance structure of the International 
Monetary Fund and apply our index to the countries and constituencies represented at the 
Fund’s Executive Board. IMF quotas are the principal issue in IMF governance because quotas 
are central for many aspects of the IMF. A country’s quota directly translates into voting rights 
because the number of votes a country has in the Fund is based primarily on the size of its 
quota. In addition, a member’s quota fixes how much that country may be called upon to lend 
to other members through the Fund. Finally, it also determines how much a member can 
borrow from the Fund. This triple role implies that proximity and linkages between voters are 8
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strategic elements when it comes to voting since the action of voting in the IMF includes the 
notion of an agreement to (financially) support another member country. For this reason, we 
use bilateral trade as an indicator reflecting the importance of country relationships. Ceteris 
paribus, countries that trade more intensively with each other will more likely enter into a 
coalition at the level of international economic policy. The results of our computations confirm 
that the United States is an important voter in the IMF. Moreover, this application permits to 
illustrate the numerical proximity between voters and explain several important features of IMF 
Executive Board functioning, and more broadly of international politics. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the 
definition of voting power indices presenting the most widely used index, namely the Banzhaf 
index, and present recent research that has tried to capture usual criticisms towards classical 
power indices. In section 3, we introduce the proximity index and apply it to the IMF Executive 
Board as a laboratory and discuss our results in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 Voting power methodology 
Voting power methodology is a valuable tool for policy analysis because it captures numerically 
the distribution of power in collective decision-making processes. Its usefulness is twofold: first, 
it reveals a distribution of effective power between voters, which can be quite different from the 
notional distribution of voting shares and which is more relevant in understanding the effective 
decision-making. Second, voting power analysis can quantify the impact of changes in voting 
procedures on the voting power of individual or groups of voters. This allows assessing the 
implications of procedural or institutional changes on the overall voting body. 
The latter element was particularly prominent in assessing the consequences on the EU’s and 
ECB’s internal voting rules as a result of the enlargement rounds (see among others Kirman et 
al., 1995; Laruelle and Widgren, 1997; Steunenberg et al., 1999; Baldwin et al., 2000 and Leech, 
2001). In this respect, by comparing notional share with effective powers given to voters, voting 
power indices allow to evaluate the fairness of voting rules and provide positive as well as 
normative tools in understanding the practices and outcomes by voting bodies. 
Following the seminal works by Penrose (1946), Shapley and Shubik (1954) and Banzhaf (1965), 
most of the work over the subsequent two decades was devoted to the refinement of indices. 
Before turning to more recent developments and the description of our new index, we first lay 
down some basic notations and definitions, and describe the most frequently used index 
developed by Banzhaf (1965). 9
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2.1 Key terminology 
Formally a voting body can be represented as a set N, which contains the n voters in the voting 
body, with N={1, 2,…, n} representing the set of voters. Let the set W include all winning 
subsets of N. Three reasonable restrictions are made (Straffin 1978): first, W contains at least 
one voter, i.e. the empty set of members cannot ensure acceptance. Second, the entire set of 
voters N ensure acceptance. Third, if S and T are subsets of N, with SW and S T then TW. 
This implies that if S can ensure acceptance and T contains all the members of S, then T can 
also ensure acceptance. These sets refer then here as at least one voter or a group of voters, i.e. a 
coalition. Hence the total number of possible subsets is 2
n. 
If these three conditions are satisfied, a simple game is then defined as an n-person game 
consisting of a pair (N, W) (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) for which the characteristic 
function v for a coalition S indicates the value of S: v(S)=1  if S is winning and v(S)=0 otherwise. 
In many voting bodies, voters may have weights, represented by their voting share. For 
example, at the IMF the Executive Directors have voting shares determined  by the sum of the 
quotas of the countries they represent, the quota share being largely determined by a country’s 
economic weight relative to that of other IMF members. Formally, the voting weights for N 
with a specified vote threshold q are denoted as [q1;w1, w2,…, wn]. Therefore, v(S)=1 iff SW  
¦iS wi s q, otherwise v(S)=0. 
A voter i is said to be critical when she has a negative swing in a coalition S if v(S)=1, but          
v(S-{i})=0. In other words, if voter i withdraws her support, she can turn a winning coalition 
into a losing one. In this spirit, the classical power indices focus on these critical voters with 
different types of winning coalitions. First, the largest possible group of winning coalitions is the 
entire set W. We define two subsets of W (Pajala et alii, 2002): The set of minimal winning 
coalitions  MWC, and the set of strictly minimal winning coalitions SMWC. In a minimal 
winning coalition there is at least one critical voter; in a strictly minimal winning coalition all 
voters are critical. This means that in a collation of the latter type, the withdrawal of any single 
voter makes the coalition lose; whereas in the former, there can also be non-critical voters, so 
the coalition might be in surplus. 
 10
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2.2 The Banzhaf index 
The absolute Banzhaf value, 
AB
i f , has been proposed by Dubey and Shapley (1979) to catch the 
sum of voter i’s swings divided by the number 2
n 1. The latter represents the overall number of 










i S v S v
f    (1) 
The inconvenient of the absolute Banzhaf index is that it gives an absolute value of power 
which can not be compared to the voting shares. The normalized Banzhaf (1965) index 
calculates the share of a critical voter in the overall number of negative swings. Hence, it 
measures how important a given voter is among a group of critical voters that can all bring 
down a winning coalition. The normalized Banzhaf index allows thus to conclude whether a 
voter has more voting power than voting share in the voting body. The normalised Banzhaf 
index of a voter i, 
NB
i f , is then defined as the ratio of its number of negative swings over the 
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2.3 Distribution of powers and stability of coalitions in the Banzhaf index 
There are indices developed in the literature that, at least indirectly, try to take account of the 
stability of coalitions. There are three main proposals in the literature that we present briefly to 
put our work in context:
2 
1.  Johnston (1978) refines the Banzhaf calculation method to yield power indices for 
critical voters by taking account the overall number of critical voters. Specifically, he aims 
at capturing the fact that in a coalition with only one critical voter, this voter is more 
powerful than in a coalition where there are two critical voters, because the threat of the 
second to withdraw reduces the power of the first. Johnston’s proposal is to divide the 
power index by the number of critical voters in a given coalition and to allocate the 
‘criticality’ equally among them. Formally, his index can be written as follows, where p 
represents the number of critical voters: 
                                                 
2 For a more complete survey of the related literature see Pajala et alii (2002). 11
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The index therefore derives the voting power of any voter i as the relative weight of this 
voter among critical voters, relative to the corresponding weight of other critical voters. 
2.  The Deegan-Packel index (1978) captures another element associated to the costs of 
maintaining a coalition. The authors try to capture the fact that the larger a coalition is in 
terms of the number of members (q), the more vulnerable it is because it is generally more 
subject to the withdrawal of members. Hence, based on the Riker’s (1962) principle of 
size, their index foresees that each voter of the minimum size winning coalition gets a part 
of the power inversely proportioned to the number of voters. The Deegan-Packel index 
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   (4) 
3.  Finally, the index developed by Colomer-Martinez (1995) captures the fact that 
coalitions are more stable with small critical voters than with larger ones, for any given 
number of voters. To illustrate, consider a situation where in a parliament a large party is 
searching for a partner to build a coalition. Ceteris paribus, it will select among the 
candidates the smallest one possible to bring it just above the majority threshold. If it can 
avoid it, it will certainly not choose another large partner, since this may raise the political 
costs to keep that partner in the coalition. The importance of this consideration is 
underscored by the fact that in national parliaments a coalition of a large and a small 





















j S v S v w
i S v S v w
f    (5) 
where w takes account of the individual weight of the partners in the coalition. 
 
2.4 Capturing linkages in coalition building and departing from the critical voters 
The second line of criticism to the classical indices has tried to overcome the hypothesis of 
symmetric voters. This has been done by introducing linkages, preferences or ideologies of 
voters, in the building of coalitions. As a result, a strand of literature has engaged in developing 
so-called preference-based indices. Researches start by laying out a priori the political space that 
either pre-connects certain voters in a deterministic fashion or assigns ex ante probabilities to 12
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different coalitions. This then helps to exclude certain combinations or to the contrary makes 
‘outlier coalitions’ more likely.  In this strand of research, the approaches of Owen (1977 and 
1982), Myerson (1977) and Bilbao (2000) consist of taking into account pre-existing coalitions’ 
structures between similar voters. Shenoy (1981) follows this line of research introducing 
ideology in a Banzhaf index using geometry to define political space of voters. Perlinger (2000) 
extends Edelman’s (1997) model and put different weights on the allowable coalitions. The 
underlying idea is that the possibility of coalition building is given by aligning coalition on an 
ideological spectrum. Along the same lines, Calvo and Lasaga (1997) and Calvo, Lasaga and van 
den Nouweland (1999) use probabilistic graphs to define the probability of coalition building 
between voters. Aleskerov (2006) defines preferences to go together in a coalition as a linear 
order and thus is able to rank preferred coalitions. He also describes preferences as an intensity 
function by extending the former voting power to cardinal information about the preferences of 
agents. 
Furthermore, some researchers (König and Bräuninger, 1998; Bräuninger and König, 2000), 
developed new approaches to better describe the influence of the voting structure on voting 
powers such as multi-chamber voting systems. More generally, Cutrone and McCarty (2007) 
reviewed and analyzed the argument of bicameralism. These studies use generally spatial models 
since these tools have proven their usefulness through the work of Ferejohn and Shipan (1990) 
and Tsebelis and Money (1997). The main assumption is that the institutions themselves, 
through the structures of their voting bodies, may determine the extent to which players are able 
to influence the outcome (Steunenberg et al., 1999). Overall, these studies have been developed 
to study institutional structures and changes, such as bi-chambers system in legislation rather 
than studying voters’ powers but they are useful in understanding numerical proximity as in a 
given game, voters are more or less able to build coalition according to the distribution of votes, 
the number of voters and the majority threshold. 
 
Generally, researchers have tried to improve the Banzhaf index by refining the distribution of 
power among coalition participants and to introduce ideology or preference in coalition 
building. However, none of them deal with the fact that some voters may appear together in 
coalitions more often than others, given the structure of the game. In other words, these indices 
do not inform us about the numerical proximity between voters which may be a strong 
determinant of coalition building. Focusing thus on the numerical proximity permits to allocate 
the power over all coalition participants, rather than focusing on the pivotal voters, since a voter 
that permits to another one to be pivotal more often should be rewarded for that. Finally, once 13
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voters’ numerical proximity is established, one may also consider that voters’ linkages play as a 
kind of external proximity in the sense that voters may build coalitions together with voters with 




3 An index of proximity 
Our approach aims at providing an index that captures the frequency voters may be able to 
form coalitions according to the characteristics of the game. Usual voting power indices are 
capturing individual measures of power, i.e. by weighting the times a voter is critical or making 
behavioural assumptions on the probability of coalition formation. Consequently, they provide 
no information on the frequency voters are able to coalesce given the structure of the vote, i.e. 
their voting shares, the size of the voting body and the majority threshold. Therefore, this paper 
proposes a new measure of voting power: The numerical proximity that captures how often 
individual voters appear in a winning coalition together. Proximity may be defined as the 
bilateral frequency of coalition formation between players. It may also be defined as a 
normalized index to be comparable to voting shares. 
Formally, our index is constructed in the following way: 
1.   From the allocation of votes and taken into account the number of voters and the majority 
threshold, the index identifies winning coalition and, as in the Banzhaf index, focuses on 
coalition with at least one critical voter. 
2.   Once critical voters are isolated, the index identifies voters sharing minimum size winning 
coalitions with them. The matrix 
X
ij    is definite as  ij    which is the number of coalitions 
in which j appears when i is critical and 
X    stands for type of index to be computed: B 
stands for Banzhaf, W for a weighted measure and L when weights are allocated through 
linkages. 
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  ,  j S i S j      , , is the bilateral normalized relative notion of 
linkages between voters. 
3.  Finally, the index may be normalized by critical voters. Indeed, proximity has been defined 
as the possibility for the player j to enter coalition building with player i when the latter is 
critical. Normalized proximity will then refer to the capacity of i to hoist voters when it’s 













     (9) 
 
The proximity index provides an indication of proximity between voters defined as the frequency 
they may build a winning coalition together, when one of them is critical. This permits to 
distribute power among all coalition participants uniformly or according to the size of the 
coalition. Introducing linkages on top proximity allows treating voters as asymmetric, eliminating 
thus usual critics against classical voting power indices. Table 1 below resumes the similarities and 
differences of the measure of proximity with the other indices introduced in the paper. 
   
Table 1: Description of voting power indices and the proximity measure of voting power 
Index Admissible coalitions Weight of voter i  in S Measure of power
Banzhaf Winning 1 Individual (normalized)
Johnston Winning 1/p: number of critical voters in S Individual (normalized)
Deegan-Packel Minimal winning 1/q: number of voters in S Individual (normalized)
Colomer-Martinez Minimal winning wi: individual weights of voters in S Individual (normalized)
Proximity à  la Banzhaf Minimal winning 1
Weighted Proximity à  
la Deegan-Packel
Minimal winning 1/q: number of voters in S
Linkage-based 
Proximity
Minimal winning φij: bilateral normalized notion of 
linkages between voter j  and i  in S
Source: Authors
Bilateral between voter i 
and j and individual 
(normalized to voter i )15
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4 Applications to the IMF EB 
4.1 Applications of the Banzhaf index to the IMF 
Our applications focuses on decisions requiring a simple majority, i.e. over 50% of total votes 
and consider mainly the voting power within the 24 member-body.3 Table 2 below reports the 
Banzhaf index in such a way to make our results comparable to the few studies dealing with 
voting power in the IMF Executive Board, namely Leech (2002), Leech and Leech (2005), 
Alonso-Meijide and Bowles (2005) and Bini Smaghi (2006). Voting shares (column A) and 
Banzhaf index (column B) are reported. Their results indicate that the voting structure of the 
IMF EB gives disproportionate power to the United States at the expense of all other members. 
This means that for the United States, effective voting power exceeds their notional voting 
share, whereas for all other 23 constituencies the opposite result holds. Alonso-Meijide and 
Bowles (2005) generated functions for the Banzhaf index. Instead of considering a game over 
the whole set of players, they defined it over some subsets of the set of players and apply it to 
the IMF. Their results (column C) are able to account for both within and between unions’ 
allocation of rewards and put forward the fact that the US may be more powerful than the 
classical Banzahf index predicts. However, the authors acknowledge that their index can not 
overcome the fact that all possible coalitions (restricted by a priori unions) are not equally likely 
and “may depend, like the constituencies’ composition, on regional, historical and geostrategic 
aspects” (Alonso-Meijide and Bowles, 2005). 
 
Table 2: Voting shares, Banzhaf index and a priori Banzhaf index: Results of previous studies 
Executive 
directors
Voting share  Banzhaf index
A priori Banzhaf  
index
United States 17.1 21.6 24.7
Japan 6.1 5.9 5.5
Germany 6.0 5.7 5.4
Belgium 5.1 5.2 4.9
France 5.0 4.7 4.5
United Kingdom 5.0 4.7 4.5
Netherlands 4.9 4.6 4.5
Mexico 4.3 4.1 3.9
Italy 4.2 4.0 3.8
Canada 3.7 3.6 3.4
Norway 3.5 3.3 3.2
Korea 3.3 3.2 3.1
Egypt 3.2 3.1 3.0
Saudi Arabia 3.2 3.0 2.9
Malaysia 3.1 3.0 2.9
Tanzania 2.9 2.8 2.7
China 2.9 2.8 2.7
Switzerland 2.7 2.6 2.5
Russia 2.6 2.5 2.4
Iran 2.5 2.3 2.3
Brazil 2.4 2.3 2.2
India 2.4 2.3 2.2
Argentina 2.0 1.9 1.9
Equatorial Guinea 1.2 1.1 1.1
Source: IMF. Executive Directors and voting shares are taken from 2002.  
                                                 
3 The Annex A presents the governance structure of the IMF and describes more precisely the voting structure. 16
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Furthermore, one might look at voting power inside constituencies applying Banzahf index within 
constituencies. Eight directors represent a single country – the United States, Japan, Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, China, Saudi-Arabia and Russia (ranked by descending quota). The 
remaining 16 directors represent constituencies, which comprise between 4 and 24 countries. One 
can also use the Banzhaf index to shed light on the current situation regarding voting power and 
Executive directors’ nomination within individual constituencies. Selected for illustrative purposes, 
Table 3 shows voting shares and Banzhaf indices for the three constituencies currently led by 
Italy, Belgium and Venezuela. Assessing the constituency led by Italy is straightforward, as Italy’s 
voting share in the constituency equals 77.8% and thus translates into a voting power of 100%. 
Therefore, this country’s historical position as a leader appears very clearly. However, the picture 
is different for the Belgian constituency, where Belgium’s share at 41.45% is large but below the 
majority threshold. Belgium’s Banzhaf index shows that its effective power is 64.8%, far ahead of 
those of other members, but still illustrating the needs to engage other partners in a coalition. As 
for constituency currently led by Venzuela, voting power analysis can explain why leadership 
rotates between the three largest countries, Spain, Mexico and Venezuela, rather than being led 
always by Mexico as the country with the highest quota. The reason is that in this specific 
constellation despite different shares, voting power equals exactly 33% for all three largest 
countries and is strictly zero for the other five members. 
 
Table 3: Voting shares and Banzhaf index within constituencies 
Executive 
directors






San Marino 0.0046 0.0000
Timor-Leste 0.0036 0.0000
Costa Rica 0.0192 0.0000














Slovak Republic 0.0336 0.0223
Slovenia 0.0225 0.0056
Turkey 0.1067 0.0670
Source: IMF, 2007; authors' computations  17
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4.2 Applications of the proximity index 
As a first step, we compute our new index in bilateral terms within a Banzhaf framework (index 
B
ij    illustrated in Chart 1.a), as well as the weighted measure of proximity (index 
W
ij    illustrated 
in Chart 1.b). This bilateral illustration is not normalized and proposed in chart 1 below. The 
domination of the US in the Executive Board is illustrated by its presence in most of the 
winning coalition as shown on the top left panel of chart 1.a. This domination may also be seen 
in the right panel of chart 1.b since the United States permits to its allies to increase their chance 
to be in a winning coalition. Indeed, when the US is critical, since it is the largest voter, it 
permits to the other players to ensure relatively more acceptance. In other words, it is more 
rewarding to build a coalition with the US than with smaller voters since building a coalition 
with US increase the probability to become a critical voter. Moreover, since the US is a large 
player, it is present in a large number of winning coalitions and is therefore also greatly 
rewarded. Finally, we computed our new index in bilateral terms accounting for linkages 
between members (index 
L
ij    illustrated in Chart 1.c). The US is still dominant since they 
appear in a large number of coalitions. Interestingly, some constituencies are emerging: Canada, 
Venezuela and Brazil. Our linkage-based measure of proximity permits to identify the fact that 
these constituencies are more likely to enter coalition building with the US than others. Not 
surprisingly, since the US are the most important members in the IMF, the linkage-based index 
captures the fact that countries that are closely related to the US, i.e. that trade much with them, 
gain from the fact that the US is the largest member in the voting body. Indeed, since Canada 
and Venezuela trade much with the US, both have a stronger will to share a coalition with the 
US and the inverse is true since the US trade much with these countries. Another interesting 
case is the one of the UK and France. Indeed, these two countries have exactly the same voting 
share of 4.86% in the IMF inducing that they have the same Banzhaf value. Still, the historical 
political position of the UK is oriented towards a quasi-unconditional support to the US. The 
results of the linkage-based index explain UK’s strategy since their power is larger than the one 
of France, respectively 4.0% and 3.65% in normalized terms as shown in table 4 below. The 
same applies also for Iran and Brazil. Indeed, both have the same voting share of 2.42% and the 
same Banzhaf value of 2.3%. However, Brazil is much closer to the US than Iran. As a result, 
the voting power of Brazil is 2.67% whereas Iran gets 1.96%. 
 18
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Table 4: Voting shares, Banzhaf and proximity normalized indices in the IMF Executive Board 








United States 16.80 20.93 23.43 25.56
Japan 6.02 5.74 5.68 5.86
German 5.88 5.61 5.54 4.79
Belgium 5.15 4.91 4.81 4.23
France 4.86 4.63 4.52 3.65
United Kingdom 4.86 4.63 4.52 4.00
Netherlands 4.76 4.53 4.42 3.75
Venezuela 4.45 4.23 4.12 5.24
Italy 4.11 3.91 3.79 3.58
Australia 3.85 3.66 3.54 2.96
China 3.66 3.48 3.36 2.97
Canada 3.64 3.46 3.34 5.87
Finland 3.44 3.27 3.15 3.11
Egypt 3.20 3.04 2.92 2.56
Saudi Arabia 3.17 3.01 2.89 2.42
Indonesia 3.12 2.96 2.84 2.58
Kenya 2.94 2.79 2.67 2.50
Switzerland 2.79 2.65 2.53 2.38
Russia 2.70 2.56 2.45 2.16
Brazil 2.42 2.30 2.19 2.67
Iran 2.42 2.30 2.19 1.96
India 2.35 2.23 2.12 1.93
Peru 1.96 1.86 1.76 1.83
Rwanda 1.39 1.32 1.24 1.44
Source: IMF (Executive Directors and voting shares are taken from 2007) and authors calculations.  
 
Another illustration of the innovation of the proximity index can be seen when dealing with 
voting inside constituencies. We employ the same examples as above, focusing on the Belgium 
constituency. Chart 2 and Table 5 below expose the results of the bilateral and normalized 
indices. Within the Belgian constituency, Banzhaf index predicts the same power of 6.7% for 
Austria and Turkey while their voting shares are 16.65% and 10.67%, respectively. In this 
situation, classical indices do not account for the stability of the coalitions, since some members 
with very different weights gets the same power. In other words, classical indices’ view is biased 
because they do not discount the distribution of power for the relative size of coalitions. 
Weighting the index permits to estimate coalition building in a stability perspective since smaller 
voters should get less power. Indeed, in our example, if Belgium enters a coalition with any of 
these two countries, the coalition will be a strictly minimum size winning one. Banzhaf predicts 
therefore the same distribution of power between them. However, the weighted proximity index 
is able to capture the fact that Austria is larger than Turkey and should thus be more rewarded 
since Austria should be in principle in a larger number of winning coalitions. The results confirm 
this since the values of Austria and Turkey are respectively 5.48% and 4.92%. Finally, introducing 
linkages between voters permits to explain that Belgium has historically been the Executive 
Director of this constituency. 20
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Table 5: Voting shares, Banzhaf and proximity normalized indices in the Belgian constituency 
 









Austria 0.1665 0.0670 0.0548 0.0455
Belarus 0.0361 0.0223 0.0150 0.0163
Belgium 0.4063 0.6480 0.7455 0.7684
Czech Republic 0.0741 0.0615 0.0429 0.0353
Hungary 0.0933 0.0615 0.0442 0.0312
Kazakhstan 0.0343 0.0223 0.0150 0.0316
Luxembourg 0.0267 0.0223 0.0148 0.0148
Slovak Republic 0.0336 0.0223 0.0150 0.0161
Slovenia 0.0225 0.0056 0.0037 0.0028
Turkey 0.1067 0.0670 0.0492 0.0379
Source: IMF, 2007; authors' computations  
 
Finally, we propose a simulation exercise. It may be informative to measure for example the 
impact of a change in the structure of the IMF executive Board. Leech and Leech (2005) 
computed Banzhaf index for different possible European single seats. They found that such a 
configuration may counterbalance the actual power of the United States and enhance the power 
of non-EU members and EU members. Bini Smaghi (2006) runs such a simulation adding a G7 
predefined coalition and found similar results. In this paper, we regroup only the three Member 
States that have their own seat: Germany, France and the UK, to avoid the problem of countries’ 
reallocation between constituencies. These countries have been chosen for illustrative purposes 
of the technical index only, and this is not necessarily judged to be a realistic scenario. Their 
aggregate voting share of 16.8% is indeed balancing the current position of the US. This is 
translated in a Banzhaf index of 17.8% for the US and 15.8% for the single EU seat (see table 6). 
The US is not losing its dominant position but their power is reduced somewhat. If we now look 
at the result of our numerical proximity index, the 
W
ij   , not surprisingly, both the US and the EU 
single seat found to gain in relatively more in voting power. Still, the US is gaining more than the 
EU single seat. Interestingly, when computing our 
L
ij    index, the dominant position of the US is 
still not thwarted by the important number of Europeans around the table of the Executive 
Board. Interestingly, differences emerge when looking at chart 3.c. Indeed, while Japan and the 
US are more likely to build coalition together, it is not the case of the EU. However, the EU seat 
would rather build a coalition with the Belgian, the Dutch and the Italian constituencies, 
reflecting thus the relative importance of linkages between voters. 
 22
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In this paper, we have presented a new framework to capture the numerical proximity of voters in 
coalition building. While standard voting power indices, such as the Banzhaf index, capture the 
relative importance of critical voters, our index gives a bilateral representation of power as the 
frequency voters may build coalition together according to the voting body’s structure and to the 
linkages among coalition participants. We first introduce the notion of proximity in a Banzhaf 
framework. Second, we proposed to weight the distribution of power à la Deegan-Packel by the 
relative size of the coalitions. Third, we included linkages among participants as a determinant of 
coalition building. 
We are particularly interested in understanding decision making at the International Monetary Fund 
and hence apply our index to the countries and constituencies represented at the Fund’s Executive 
Board. We computed our new measure in two steps allowing capturing first the numerical proximity 
of voters and second the linkages between voters within the Executive Board of the IMF. For this 
application in the context of international economic cooperation, we use bilateral trade as an indicator 
reflecting the importance of countries’ relationships. The results are able to explain several important 
features of IMF Executive Board functioning, and more broadly of international politics. 
Looking ahead, more work is needed on the definition of the proximity measure, its properties and its 
application within other voting power indices. On the practical side, to better measure and 
conceptualize linkages among coalition participants remains a challenging but appealing issues for 
further research. 







United States 16.80 17.81 19.72 22.83
DE-UK-FR 15.61 15.76 17.20 17.59
Japan 6.02 6.03 5.86 5.47
Belgium 5.15 5.11 4.92 4.77
Netherlands 4.76 4.70 4.52 3.69
Venezuela 4.45 4.39 4.20 4.28
Italy 4.11 4.05 3.86 4.18
Australia 3.85 3.78 3.60 2.58
China 3.66 3.59 3.41 2.80
Canada 3.64 3.57 3.39 4.17
Finland 3.44 3.37 3.19 3.38
Egypt 3.20 3.13 2.96 2.30
Saudi Arabia 3.17 3.11 2.93 2.12
Indonesia 3.12 3.06 2.88 2.65
Kenya 2.94 2.88 2.71 2.24
Switzerland 2.79 2.73 2.56 2.75
Russia 2.70 2.64 2.48 2.19
Brazil 2.42 2.36 2.21 3.44
Iran 2.42 2.36 2.21 1.56
India 2.35 2.30 2.15 1.85
Peru 1.96 1.91 1.78 1.65
Rwanda 1.39 1.36 1.26 1.52
Source: IMF (Executive Directors and voting shares are taken from 2007) and authors calculations.  
Table 6: Voting shares, Banzhaf and proximity normalized indices: A simulation exercise 24
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Decision process at the International Monetary Fund 
In the IMF, the votes of each of the 184 member countries are determined by the member’s quota – a 
variable broadly determined by a country’s relative economic position but including political judgement – 
plus a small number of so-called basic votes that are distributed equally across members (see Skala et al., 
2007, for an overview of the role of IMF quotas and the ongoing reform).4  
Originally conceived to favour smallest members, the overall share of basic votes has declined 
continuously from 11.3% of total votes in the 1950s to only 2.1% of total votes today. When a country 
joins, it is assigned an initial quota in the same range as the quotas of existing members considered to be 
broadly comparable in economic size and characteristics. Quotas have a fourfold function: They 
determine the maximum amount of resources a member is called upon to provide to the institution, serve 
as the basis for voting rights, determine the distribution of Special Drawing Rights allocations and serve as 
the basis for access to resources. Quotas are calculated on the basis of a set of formulas.5 The main 
decision making body is the Executive Board, which is responsible for conducting the day-to-day business 
of the IMF. It is composed of 24 Directors, who are appointed or elected by member countries or by 
groups of countries, and it is chaired by the Fund’s Managing Director. The Executive Board usually 
meets three times each week and carries out its work largely on the basis of papers prepared by IMF 
management and staff. The bulk of decisions of the Fund are taken by a simple majority of the votes cast.6 
However, for a number of specific votes, thresholds of 70% and 85% are required (see Table A1 below). 
 
Table A1: Minimum threshold for decisions at the IMF Executive Board 
The bulk of decisions require a simple majority of votes cast.
Decision requiring a 70% majority include:
         Suspension or reinstatement of voting rights
         Determination of rates of charge or remuneration
         Valuation of SDR: Other change than fundamental change in principle
         Determination of rate of interest on SDRs
Decision requiring a 85% majority include:
         Amendment of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement*
         Adjustment of quotas 
         Allocation of SDRs
         Sale of gold
         Compulsory withdrawal from the IMF (exclusion of a member)
Source: IMF. *In this case, a majority of three-fifths of the members having 85% of the voting power is needed.
                                                 
4 There are also 250 so-called basic votes that every member receives, in addition to one vote for each SDR 100,000 
in quota. For the median IMF member in terms of quota, Argentina, total votes consist of the 250 basic votes 
plus 30,000 votes from its quota. Hence, the basic votes are relevant only for very small countries. 
5 The first formula was used in 1944 as a basis for determining the broad configuration of the initial quota 
distribution became known as the Bretton Woods formula. This formula contained five variables: national 
income, official reserves, imports, export variability, and the ratio of exports to national income. A multi-formula 
approach was introduced in the early 1960s, when the Bretton Woods formula was supplemented with four other 
formulas containing the same basic variables but with larger weights for external trade and external variability. 
The quota formulas were last modified in the context of the Eighth General Review (1982/83) but their basic 
structure was retained. For each of the four non-Bretton Woods formulas, quota calculations are multiplied by an 
adjustment factor so that the sum of the calculations across members equals that derived from the Bretton 
Woods formula. 
6 The actual voting process is somewhat more complicated: Whenever voting is required under Article V (Section 4 
or 5), each member has the number of votes to which it is entitled adjusted by the addition of one vote for the 
equivalent of each SDR 400,000 of net sales of its currency from the general resources of the Fund up to the date 
when the vote is taken, or the subtraction of one vote for the equivalent of each four hundred thousand special 
drawing rights of its net purchases under Article V (Section 3(b) and (f)) up to the date when the vote is taken, 
provided that neither net purchases nor net sales shall be deemed at any time to exceed an amount equal to the 
quota of the member involved. 28
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ANNEX B 
 
Determinants of coalition building in the international financial institutions 
In the special case of international politics, for which the Bretton Woods institutions are good examples, 
decisions are involving in most of the case an action (financial or not) on a member or a group of 
members. The IMF decides on financial assistance to members, on organising principles of the 
international monetary system (rules of cooperation, sharing of financial contributions among members, 
composition of the special drawing rights, etc.) and on members’ compliance with these principles (for 
example in the surveillance framework that can entail decisions on whether countries comply with their 
obligation to report data to the Fund and maintain policies that are conducive to overall international 
stability). Moreover, the IMF promotes international monetary cooperation more broadly including 
through the provision of analysis of international linkages and spillovers, it gives policy advice to members 
and it provides technical assistance to help countries build and maintain strong economies. The World 
Bank decides on loans and grants for project in member countries, and it lays the rules for international 
development assistance. 
Therefore, coalition building is likely to be influenced a priori by economic bilateral relations between 
members.7 Of course, we cannot ignore the general policy content of IMF and World Bank interventions, 
and the choice of the proxy to account for economic bilateral relations between members should 
therefore capture this element. In this respect, we believe that bilateral trade between members is a 
reasonable first candidate as a proxy for a measure of proximity between members of the Executive board 
of the IMF and the World Bank. For one thing, one should choose a proxy that captures not only 
economic, but also political relations between countries. In this respect bilateral trade seems to be a link 
that goes well beyond pure exchange of goods and services, as pointed out already by Montesquieu in his 
essay De l’esprit des Lois (1758): 
“Two nations which trade together, render themselves reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest 
in selling; and all unions are based upon mutual needs.” 
Studies dealing with international trade have focused for a long time on explaining the relation between 
trade and conflict. Indeed, the liberal view in political science argues that increasing trade flows, enhancing 
free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. For 
example, Martin et al. (2006) argue that bilateral trade deters bilateral war, because it increases the 
opportunity cost of bilateral war. Moreover, as suggested by the geographic economic literature (see 
Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004 for a survey), bilateral trade is a superior proxy for bilateral relations 
between countries because it captures the border effect associated by at least 6 determinants: (1) the distance 
barrier (Srivastava and Green, 1986; and Krugman, 1991), (2) the language barrier (Eaton and Kortum, 
2002; and Hummels, 2001), (3) the currency barrier (Rose and Wincoop, 2001; Rose, 2004, Estevadeordal, 
Frantz and Taylor, 2003; and Lopez-Cordova and Meissner, 2003), (4) the informational barrier (Portes 
and Rey, 2005; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Head and Ries, 1998), (5) the contracting costs and insecurity 
barrier (Evans, 2001; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002) and (6) the non-tariff policy barrier (Haarigan, 
1993; Head and Mayer, 2000; and Chen, 2002). Finally, Rose (2004) has shown using a gravity model that 
bilateral trade may also capture historical (i.e. colonial) and geographic dimensions. 
Table A2 below shows bilateral flows between countries represented at the table of the IMF Executive 
Board (with origin countries in columns). We are now able to define a priori policy space of members. 
Chart A2.1 below illustrate this for two interesting countries, the US and Germany. Indeed, as we can see, 
bilateral relations can be illustrated by a sort of ‘snail’ if we rank members by decreasing intensity of 
bilateral trade. We note for example that Germany’s trade is spread more equally across trading partners 
(with France taking the highest share at about 17%), whereas US external trade is more heavily 
concentrated (with Canada taking the highest share at 30%). In political terms, we can interpret, these 
distributions loosely speaking as exports of country X to country Y capturing ‘how much country X can 
influence country Y’ and imports of country Y to country X capturing ‘how much country X can be 
influenced by country Y’. Comparing for example chart 3 for the US and chart 4 which graph levels of US 
exports shares into others Executive Board members, we are able to distinguish between who the US 
                                                 
7 Of course, the determinants of voting power index such as the weights, their distribution and the majority rule still 
play an important role in coalition building. But, it is not straightforward to identify what kind of determinants, 
ideological or numerical, play more, and moreover it is out of the scope of this paper. We consider that this is, 
however, an interesting path for future research. 29
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influence and by whom the US can be influenced. For example, we notice that the US could be very 
influential on a number of countries, such as Malaysia and India to pick two examples, but that only few 
countries may be influential on the US, which would include Canada or Venezuela. 
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